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Prior Consistent Statements: The Dangers of
Misinterpreting Recently Amended Federal
Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B)
Laird C. Kirkpatrick* and Christopher B. Mueller**
ABSTRACT
A recent amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) expands the
situations in which prior consistent statements by testifying witnesses can be used
as substantive evidence, and not merely as rehabilitating evidence. In this piece,
the Authors argue that the revised rule may mislead judges and lawyers to
conclude that prior consistent statements are always usable as substantive
evidence when offered to rehabilitate a witness. Nothing could be further from the
truth. The intent, although hard to discern on the face of the revised rule, is only
to allow substantive use of consistent statements that are otherwise admissible to
rehabilitate the testimony of a witness whose credibility has been attacked in a
way that can be properly answered by proving prior consistencies. Thus the rule
allows substantive use of consistent statements when they are relevant to repair
attacks charging the witness with having forgotten what actually happened or
charging the witness with making prior inconsistent statements in those limited
cases in which proving consistent statements could refute such an attack. Perhaps
most importantly, the revised rule does not do away with the premotive
requirement adopted by the Supreme Court in the Tome case more than twenty
years ago.

Federal Rule of Evidence (“FRE”) 801(d)(1)(B) has long provided that
prior statements consistent with the testimony of a witness who is subject
to cross-examination may be introduced and used as substantive evidence
when offered “to rebut an express or implied charge that the declarant
recently fabricated it or acted from a recent improper influence or motive in
so testifying.”1 At the end of 2014, the rule was amended to also allow
prior consistent statements to be introduced as substantive evidence when
offered “to rehabilitate the declarant’s credibility as a witness when
attacked on another ground.”2
When the Federal Judicial Center circulated the proposed amendment

* Louis Harkey Mayo Research Professor of Law, The George Washington
University Law School.
** Henry S. Lindsley Professor of Procedure and Advocacy, University of Colorado
School of Law.
1 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B)(i).
2 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B)(ii).
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to federal district judges for comment, they overwhelmingly predicted that
the amendment would lead to a significant expansion in attempts to
introduce prior consistent statements at trial, even though this was not the
purpose of the amendment.3 To respond to this concern, the Advisory
Committee added a Note to the amended rule, specifically stating:
This amendment does not change the traditional and well-accepted
limits on bringing prior consistent statements before the factfinder
for credibility purposes. It does not allow impermissible
bolstering of a witness. . . . The amendment does not make any
consistent statement admissible that was not admissible
previously—the only difference is that prior consistent statements
otherwise admissible for rehabilitation are now admissible
substantively as well.4
Nonetheless, a significant danger remains that the amended rule will
be misunderstood by lawyers and judges and applied in an overlyexpansive fashion. This risk is not only because Advisory Committee
Notes are sometimes overlooked or ignored in the heat of trial,5 but also
because the amended rule does not itself specify when prior consistent
statements may be used to rehabilitate witnesses. Instead, it adopts federal
common law on the issue of when prior consistent statements are
admissible for rehabilitation and merely provides that if a prior consistent
statement is admissible for rehabilitation, it is also admissible for its truth.
Thus, to apply the amendment properly, attorneys and courts must research
and consider law outside FRE 801(d)(1)(B).
This point would have been made clearer if the drafters had added just
three words to the amended language, so that it read “when otherwise
admissible to rehabilitate the declarant’s credibility as a witness when
attacked on another ground.”6 As a leading academic commentator has
noted, the lack of such a constraint means that lawyers and judges may “be
lulled into a false sense of security that the rehabilitation requirement is
3 See TIM REAGAN & MARGARET S. WILLIAMS, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., SURVEY OF
DISTRICT COURT JUDGES ON A PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE
801(D)(1)(B) CONCERNING PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS 9 (Mar. 2, 2012),
http://www fjc.gov/ public/pdf.nsf/lookup/rule801d1b.pdf/$file/rule801d1b.pdf.
4 FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee’s note to 2014 amendment (emphasis
added).
5 See generally, e.g., Hill v. U.S. Postal Serv., 961 F.2d 153, 156 (11th Cir. 1992)
(citing Hunt v. Dep’t of Air Force, 787 F. Supp. 197 (M.D. Fla. 1992)) (“The court in Hunt
overlook[ed] . . . the Advisory Committee Notes.”); Vergis v. Grand Victoria Casino &
Resort, 199 F.R.D. 216, 217 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (“[T]he Sixth Circuit appears to have
completely ignored [a] particular Advisory Committee Note.”).
6 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B)(ii).
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automatically satisfied for any prior consistent statement falling within the
amended Rule” and misinterpret the rule “to bless and automatically admit
any prior consistent statement offered to repair an impeaching attack.”7
Even those lawyers and judges who recognize that proper application
of FRE 801(d)(1)(B) requires resort to law outside the rule itself face a
challenge, because there is no other provision in the Federal Rules of
Evidence addressing rehabilitation by use of prior consistent statements.
Instead, they must look to the federal common law.8 The Advisory
Committee’s Note says the amended rule is subject to the “traditional and
well-accepted limits” on admitting prior consistent statements for
rehabilitation, but it does not detail what they are.9
Perhaps the most fundamental common law limitation on the use of
prior consistent statements is that they cannot be introduced to rehabilitate
a witness after every kind of impeaching attack, despite the language in the
rule about using prior consistent statements to rehabilitate after the witness
has been attacked “on another ground.”10 For example, impeachment by
evidence of prior convictions, prior bad acts, bad character for truthfulness,
and failure of perception (such as bad eyesight) do not ordinarily provide a
basis to rehabilitate a witness by introducing a prior consistent statement.11
The only two types of attack mentioned in the Advisory Committee
Note as potentially being covered by the amended language are (1) a
charge of “faulty memory” and (2) evidence of “an inconsistency in the
witness’s testimony.”12 Certainly an attack on a witness’s memory should
trigger the right to rehabilitate the witness by evidence of a consistent
statement made at or near the time of the event about which she is
testifying. But even here caution is in order. A charge of faulty memory

7 Liesa Richter, Seeking Consistency for Prior Consistent Statements, 46 CONN. L.
REV. 937, 972–73 (2014).
8 See 6 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 801:12, at 242–44
(7th ed. 2012) (explaining that situations exist in which prior consistent statements “may be
admitted without reference to Rule 801(d)(1)(B)”); 4 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL.,
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL § 801.03[4][j] (10th ed. 2011) (citing cases that
demonstrate that FRE 801(d)(1)(B) is not the only authority under which to admit prior
consistent statement).
9 FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee’s note to 2014 amendment.
10 See generally 4 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL
EVIDENCE § 8.39, at 340–41 (4th ed. 2013) (explaining that prior consistent statements can
only be introduced to rehabilitate a witness after certain attacks and quoting FRE
801(d)(1)(B)(ii)).
11 See 4 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§§ 8.38–.39 (4th ed. Supp. 2016).
12 FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee’s note to 2014 amendment.
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does not open the door to all prior consistent statements.13 For example, if
a witness is challenged about her ability to remember the details of an
accident she observed four years ago, it does not rehabilitate her to bring
out a consistent statement she made at a deposition two weeks prior to her
current testimony.
Similarly, it has never been the rule that impeachment by prior
inconsistent statement automatically opens the door to evidence of prior
consistent statements.14 Proving prior consistent statements does not
remove the sting of vacillation raised by the inconsistent statements
because the inconstancy remains.15 Only in certain limited circumstances
does a prior consistent statement rehabilitate a witness who has been
impeached with a prior inconsistent statement. For example, a prior
consistent statement may rehabilitate a witness by clarifying or giving
context to the alleged prior inconsistent statement or by supporting a denial
that the prior inconsistent statement was ever made.16 And, of course,
sometimes impeachment by a prior inconsistent statement will suggest that
the direct testimony of the witness is a recent fabrication or a product of
improper influence or motive, which would trigger the opportunity to
rehabilitate the witness with a prior consistent statement under FRE
801(d)(1)(B)(i).17
If federal judges are correct that adoption of this amendment will lead
to more frequent attempts to offer prior consistent statements, another
danger presents itself.
Sometimes attorneys offer prior consistent
statements containing significant details that were not included in the trial
testimony of the declarant.18 An important and well-established common
law limitation on the use of prior consistent statements, particularly since
they are generally not made under oath, is that they cannot go beyond what
the witness testified to at trial.19 This restriction is another that will require

See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 10, § 8.38, at 344–45.
See id. § 6.102, at 647.
15 See id. § 6.102, at 651.
16 See, e.g., United States v. Castillo, 14 F.3d 802, 806 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that the
district court properly admitted prior consistent statements where the statements clarified
whether alleged inconsistent statements were actually inconsistent); United States v. Payne,
944 F.2d 1458, 1471–72 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that district court properly admitted prior
consistent statements where statements put inconsistent statements in context, mitigating the
significance of the inconsistencies).
17 See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B)(i).
18 See, e.g., Jordan ex rel. Shealey v. Masters, 821 So. 2d 342, 349–50 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2002) (holding that evidence of prior consistent statement should not have been
admitted because it contained new information that was not in trial testimony).
19 See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 10, § 8:38, at 337–39.
13
14
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careful judicial policing in those cases where prior consistent statements
are properly admissible under the amended rule.
Another possible misinterpretation of the amended rule would be to
view it as eliminating the premotive requirement established by Tome v.
United States.20 In Tome, the Supreme Court held that a prior consistent
statement offered to rehabilitate a witness who had been impeached by an
alleged motive to fabricate, hence admissible as substantive evidence under
FRE 801(d)(1)(B), must have been made prior to the time that motive
arose.21
The primary goal of the earliest advocates for amending the rule was to
overturn Tome and reject the premotive requirement.22 Based on its earlier
drafts and commentary, the Advisory Committee originally appeared to be
headed in this direction.23 However, the Committee apparently had second
thoughts about using a proposed rule amendment to overturn a Supreme
Court decision. Thus, the amended rule was submitted to the Supreme
Court and promulgated with an Advisory Committee Note that specifically
states: “The amendment retains the requirement set forth in Tome v. United
States . . . that under Rule 801(d)(1)(B), a consistent statement offered to
rebut a charge of recent fabrication [or] improper influence or motive must
have been made before the alleged fabrication or improper inference or
motive arose.”24
The question remains whether a postmotive statement, even if not
admissible under FRE 801(d)(1)(B) as substantive evidence, can
nonetheless be received solely for rehabilitation, as a few courts have
permitted.25 Such a strategy is inconsistent with both Tome and the

Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150 (1995).
Id. at 167.
22 See, e.g., Frank W. Bullock, Jr. & Steven Gardner, Prior Consistent Statements and
the Premotive Rule, 24 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 509, 534 (1997) (urging that FRE 801(d)(1)(B)
be amended to allow postmotive statements to be admitted as substantive evidence, thereby
overturning Tome).
23 See Minutes of the Meeting of May 3, 2013, Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules,
3–4 (June 3–4, 2013), http://federalevidence.com/pdf/FRE_Amendments/801d/ACER.
Minutes.5-13.pdf (explaining that one version of the proposed amendment caused concern
over potential inconsistency with Tome’s premotive rule).
24 FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee’s note to 2014 amendment. The Note
mistakenly uses the phrase “recent fabrication of improper influence” where it should say
“recent fabrication or improper influence.” Id. The Note also contains a mistakenly placed
“1” in the text. Id.
25 See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 761 F.2d 394, 399–400 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding
that trial court did not err in admitting postmotive prior consistent statements solely for
rehabilitative purposes); United States v. Parry, 649 F.2d 292, 296 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding
that trial court erred in excluding postmotive prior consistent statement offered for
20
21
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amended rule. In adopting the premotive requirement, the Tome Court was
stating a common law relevancy principle as well as interpreting a hearsay
rule.26 It is extremely unlikely that the Tome Court would have approved
the use of the postmotive statements offered in that case if only a limiting
instruction had been given telling the jury they were to be considered
merely for rehabilitation.
To allow postmotive statements for rehabilitation would also go
against both the letter and the spirit of the amended rule. The amended rule
states that any prior consistent statement properly admitted for
rehabilitation is now substantive evidence.27 To allow a postmotive
statement for rehabilitation only, a court would have to block the automatic
effect of FRE 801(d)(1)(B) by giving a limiting instruction. But in doing
so, the court would be returning to a two-tier system where some prior
consistent statements come in as substantive evidence and others only for
rehabilitation. The very purpose of the amendment was to abolish this twotier system and eliminate the need for courts to give limiting instructions
when prior consistent statements are properly received for rehabilitative
purposes.28
Litigators and judges would be well advised to consult both common
law rehabilitation principles, as well as Tome, when seeking to interpret
and apply the recently-amended language of FRE 801(d)(1)(B).

rehabilitative purposes).
26 See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 157–59 (1995).
27 FED. R. EVID. 801(d); FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee’s note to 2014
amendment.
28 See Richter, supra note 7, at 942.

